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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
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SUBURBIA LAND COMPANY, an 
Idaho corporation, et. a l . , 
Defendants and 
Counter-Appellants. 
Case No. 13753 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the above named defendants-appellants, Suburbia 
Land Company of Idaho, Nevada, and Utah, together with the defendant-
appellant Lester Romero, and move the Court for a rehearing of the above 
entitled case by reason of e r ror by the Supreme Court in overlooking and 
misconstruing material facts and the status of defendants1 briefs, basing 
its decision on incorrect principles of law, overlooking seven critical issues 
raised by the defendants, overlooking applicable decisions and misapplication 
of law to the facts and status of the case, all of which materially affected the 
resulting decision of the Court. The following is a brief statement of the 
points wherein the Supreme Court is believed to have erred in it rs decision 
(see brief for additional details and explanations): 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT DEFENDANTS HAD 
DESIGNATED ONLY THOSE PORTIONS OF THE RECORD FAVORABLE TO 
THEMSELVES, AND THAT MUCH THAT WAS DESIGNATED WAS CONTRO-
VERTED BY THE UNDESIGNATED PORTIONS. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS' 
BRIEFS WERE LOADED WITH UNREFERENCED, SELF-SERVING STATEMENTS 
OF FACTS AND CONTENTIONS AND THAT DEFENDANT EXPECTED THE 
COURT TO CONDUCT THEIR RESEARCH. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESPOND TO THE FIRST 
SIX POINTS RAISED BY DEFENDANTS WHICH POINTS ARE BASICALLY 
POINTS OF LAW AS APPLIED TO UNCONTROVERTED MATTERS OF FACT. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESPOND TO THE SEVENTH 
POINT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANTS WHICH POINT WAS A QUESTION OF 
PROCEDURE AND HAD VERY LITTLE IF ANYTHING TO DO WITH ANYTHING 
CONTAINED IN THE TRIAL TESTIMONY. 
POINT V 
APPELLANTS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO A 
WRITTEN DECISION RESOLVING EACH OF THE POINTS RAISED IN THEIR 
APPEAL BRIEF AND STATING THE REASONS FOR THAT DECISION. 
WHEREFORE, appellants pray for a r ehea r ing of th is m a t t e r on 
the m e r i t s and upon the grounds stated in appellants appeal brief and rep ly 
brief, and for an o r d e r r e v e r s i n g the judgment of the t r i a l court , re ins ta t ing 
the contract , and remanding the case for fur ther proceedings consis tent 
therewith . 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT L. LORD 
118 Metro Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellants 
* Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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J. R. BAGNALL,
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UAUNALL, and F L O R E N C E 
H/HJNALL, 
P l a in t i f f s and 
R e s p o n d e n t s , 
v s . 
SUBURBIA LAND COMPANY, ;in 
Idaho c o r p o r a t i o n , r>. - 1 
D e f e n d a n t s and 
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C a s e No. PMTPI 
A P P E L L A M ' S B R I E F AND AI T H O R i T I E S LP> S e P P O K T 
O F MOTION FOR REHEARING 
S T A T E M E N T O P N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
T h i s c a s e Invo lves a n ac t ion to forfei t a r e a l e s t a t e a g r e e m e n t for 
aJ l eged f a i l u r e to m a k e t h e r e q u i r e d i n s t a l l m e n t • ;, . n 1 to I(«IH I iith • > sonit? 
5 70 a c r e s of land i n t h e plai n t i f fs . 
DISPOSITION" IN THE LOWE! ' c t ' ;yn 
T h e C o u r t den ied t h e de fendan t s 1 i nk ie r - -or j u d g m e n t on the 
v e r d i c t , , in the a l t e r n a t i v e . ":v ,i IU v, I r in l , utel g r a n t e d jiuignit nl. m favor 
of th"4 p la in t i f f s , .in.I a^viii-.* t he de fendan t s f o r r e : t i n ^ the r e a l e s t a t e a g r e e m e n t 
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tr,'Ti\"., y/hudi 1P'1 C our ! , by S u r : n - u ^ J u d g m e n t end D e c r e e of Quxci T i t U , 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
awarded to United Paint and Colors , Plaintiff 's appeal froin +he Summary 
Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title is also pending before this honorable court . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
" • -svll- w - ' V-IV" l-iii1"1) "( s'-k .%-.-. l - ;- ,;•;-• ;" 
Forfeiture, and seek to ;:,vo judgment entered 1:1 then* lavor ^Ismis^mg the 
con ip] aint of 1:1 le plai nti ff a nd rei nstati ng the coi 1 t rac t. Defendants further seek 
an award and judgment for at torney fees and cos ts , and to have the matter 
remanded back to the I)i s t r i c I: Court foi " a de termina ti on of dan: 1a ges, adjust-
ments and offsets due defendants from the plain tiffs. 
s rA rEMEN r c )i P ' \c rs 
Appellants /.irorporaU1 b\ reference the /.iciiornent of ' a t r as 
containc a in ; :-.v origii:^; ;..:;,: L. pi; M .. ^ v:.* -,* : K M \ \ ; \ HK* Ja - : .no ; i ^ 
the Court is ^pivnficaliy -lirc'ciua 10 ihe Appendix ^oiitaincJ in the i \ pi; hrief 
which contains extensive re fe rences to the r eco rd in support of the facts as 
stated therein. 
The exceedingly complex nature of th r legal and factual i s sues 
involved in this case makes it difficult for counsel to c lear ly understand, a nc I 
the w r i t e r can well apprec ia te the difficulty encountered by the m e m b e r s of the 
Supreme Court in attempting to follow and understand the a rguments of appellants 
as contained in t he i r origi nal and r ep l j briefs on file herei n. It appears , however, 
that the Supreme Coi ir t misunders tood the 1 latu ire of tl le points of e r r o r rel ief 
upon by the appellants , and may very well have overlooked appellants r e s t a t emen t 
of facts which 1 :,i ' as i ncluded i 11 the reply brief as an appendix. 
ARGI fMENT 
POINT I 
Tl IE COURT ERRED !N CONCI /I JDINC, Til \ T DEFENDANTS HAD 
DESIGNATED-ONLY THOSE PORTIONS OF THE RECORD FAVORABLE TO Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THEMSELVES, AND THAT MUCH THAT WAS DESIGNATED WAS CONTROVERTED 
BY THE* UNDESIGNATED PORTIONS. 
The decision of the Supreme Court herein, filed October 31, 1975, 
stated that counsel for the defendants had designated only those parts of the 
record favorable to defendants' position and that much of the designated portion 
appeared to have been controverted as demonstrated by the tr ial court 's written 
findings. The decision further stated that practically no references were made 
to the record to substantiate the factual situation represented by counsel to have 
existed. As is fully demonstrated in defendants1 reply brief, the record before 
the court is complete in all relevant particulars and fairly and accurately 
reflects the missing testimony. As will be more fully explored below, defendants1 
briefs are fully referenced with over 239 citations to the record, exhibits, and 
transcript. 
It is evident that the Court based its decision upon its misapprehen-
sion of the state and condition of the record and of defendants* briefs as is 
demonstrated by the following quotation from page one of the decision: 
"As a result we have before us briefs of both sides loaded 
with unreferenced, self-serving statements of facts and con-
tentions, with an apparent invitation that we perform their 
procedural obligations and conduct their research. We cannot 
indulge them such luxury under the circumstances here. This 
Court, therefore, under elementary principles anent appellate 
review, in this particular case will presume the findings of the 
Court to have been supported by admissible, competent, sub-
stantial evidence.H 
As pointed out on page 4 of defendants1 reply brief, the missing 
portions of the oral testimony are insignificant when compared with the 
voluminous amount of testimony actually brought before the Court. The only 
testimony not before the Court is the direct examination of J. R. Bagnall, 
(every point covered in direct was carefully re-examined on cross); the direct 
of Don V. Tibbs (as with J. R. BagnalPs direct, every point covered on direct Digitized by t e Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. R uben Clark Law Scho l, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was re-covered in detail on cross); the testimony of LeLand Peterson (who 
testified that he had not been an officer of Suburbia Land); the testimony of 
John Brown (who testified as to the appraised value of the ranch); and some of 
the cross of Reed Maxfield (the Court does have 68 pages of Maxfield's cross). 
Except for the testimony of LeLand Peterson which may have some bearing 
upon the credibility of Mr, Maxfield, none of the omitted testimony has anything 
to add to that actually before the Court, and counsel has repeatedly stated, and 
herein re-s ta tes , that the testimony as designated, and particularly as actually 
before the Court accurately depicts the testimony of the participants at the trial . 
How can the Court state that only part of the testimony favorable to the defendants 
is before the Court, or that much of the testimony before the Court is contro-
verted by the missing portions, without reading what is actually before them. 
In the recent case of Nagle vs. Club Fontainbleu, 17 U. 2d. 125, 
405 P. 2d. 346 (1965), the court made the following observation: 
11
 Only a partial transcript of the tr ial , containing exerpts 
from the testimony has been brought here. Upon reading it we 
perceive therein nothing which would compel a determination 
contrary to that made by the t r ial court. n 
The appellants Suburbia and Romereo maintain that the testimony 
before the Court will compel a determination contrary to that made by the t r ial 
court, and earnestly beg the Court to give due consideration to the arguments 
contained in their briefs and the carefully review the evidence cited in support 
thereof. If the Court does not do so, the effect of its ruling in this case can 
only be to negate Rule 75 (e), and all appeals must, from this time foreward 
include the entire record, thereby vastly increasing the expense to the litigants 
and adding to the workload of this Court. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS' Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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BRIEFS WERE LOADED WITH UNREFERENCED, SELF-SERVING STATEMENTS 
OF FACTS AND CONTENTIONS AND THAT DEFENDANTS EXPECTED THE 
COURT TO CONDUCT THEIR RESEARCH. 
The undersigned writer is undoubtedly responsible for leading the 
Court into e r ro r in this regard. The statement of facts as contained in appellants1 
original appeal brief was admittedly not very well referenced. Counsel can only 
say that his attempt to set forth the facts was straight foreward and he assumed 
that the statement as prepared would be accepted by plaintiffs. If so, it would 
have been, in essence, an abstract of much of the testimony as contemplated 
by the rules. Even so, defendants1 appeal brief contains at least 100 citations 
to the record, exhibits, and testimony. Most of them are admittedly contained 
in the arguments rather than in the statement of facts. 
When, however, plaintiffs challenged defendants' version of the 
facts, the defendants reprinted that statement as an appendix to their reply brief. 
Every fact was referenced by appropriate citation to the record, exhibits, or 
oral testimony. That restatement alone contains at least 87 references, with an 
additional 52 included in the arguments. Between the appeal brief and the reply 
brief, defendants have made over 239 references to the appropriate exhibits, 
records, and testimony. Counsel represents to the Court that over 100 man 
hours were spent developing those citations alone. With such ample references, 
counsel cannot understnad how the Court can make the assertion that defendants1 
brief is loaded with self-serving and unreferenced statements of facts and con-
tentions. Counsel asks the Court to reconsider its finding in this regard and to 
give defendants' briefs and arguments the due consideration counsel believes 
they deserve. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESPOND TO THE FIRST 
SIX POINTS RAISED BY DEFENDANTS WHICH POINTS ARE BASICALLY POINTS 
OF LAW AS APPLIED TO UNCONTROVERTED MATTERS OF FACT. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. Point 1 of the appellants appeal brief lists 10 major defects in 
the title to the land the sel lers were supposed to deliver to the buyers. 
Those defects consisted of the following: 
(a) Encroachment of the railroad right of way. 
(b) Encroachment of the county road. 
(c) Loss of 1/2 interest in 140.15 acres , containing the bulk of 
the improvements. 
(d) Loss of the fee simple interest in . 57 acres containing the main 
residence. 
(e) Property in the name of sel ler ' s son J. A. Bagnall. 
(f) Private easements. 
(g) Unreleased lis pendens. 
(h) 1. 5 acres in the name of strangers Sharp and Hansen. 
(i) Outstanding oil and gas leases. 
(j) Failure to deposit water stock into escrow within the time 
allowed by the contract, or at any time prior to the notice of default and com-
mencement of suit. 
In addition, sel lers did not tender the abstract to the buyers at any 
time, although required to complete the abstract by the terms of the modification 
agreement. Except for the matter of the private easement, all of the foregoing 
defects are uncontroverted. In defense thereto, plaintiffs assert that buyers 
represented that they had acquired all of the interest of the parties. (See their 
brief, page 18). The Supreme Court in rendering its decision herein, apparently 
assumed that to be the fact. On page 2 of the decision, the Court states that 
Suburbiafs agent represented that it had acquired Jean B. Nyber's individually 
claimed and acquired one-half interest in the 140.15 acre tract . Even if it were 
to be conceded that the buyers had made such a representation and that it wrmiH Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may ontain errors.
be controlling in the face of the representations to the contrary contained in the 
modification agreement, and the warranties to the contrary contained in the 
warranty deed on file with the escrow, the Court must still contend with the 
trther 10 defects listed above, all of them being substantial and material . 
As pointed out on page 15 of defendants' appeal brief, 57-1-3, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, states: 
nA fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a 
conveyance of real estate unless it appears from the conveyance 
that a lesser estate was intended. M 
Bagnall's attempt to vary the meaning of their warranty deed, and 
to vary the plain meaning of the modification agreement by parol should not be 
allowed. In the case of Van Cott vs. Jacklin, 226 P. 460 (Utah 1924) the Court 
found that the warranties controlled even where the buyer knew that the vendor 
did not own all of the ground conveyed. 
In the case of Leavitt vs. Blohn, (1960), 11 Utah 2d. 220, 357 P. 2d. 
190, discussed at some length in defendants' appeal brief, page 15 and 17, the 
Court had occassion to determine the effect of the vendor's failure to perfect 
his title before attempting to default the purchaser. The Court stated that the 
obligations in an installment land contract runs both ways and that the buyer 
could not enforce his rights if he failed to make his payments. MBy the same 
token, if the seller fails to meet his commitment he likewise cannot expect the 
buyer to perform. fl The Idaho Court in the case of Sorensen vs. Larue (1927), 
252 P. 494, stated that the vendor must furnish good title as of the date required 
by the contract, and failing to do so, even though the buyer was admittedly unable 
to make the payments, the vendor could not default the vendee and bring suit for 
foreclosure. He had to tender performance as required by the contract before 
he could default the vendee. And finally, in the case of Roberts vs. Braffett 
(Utah 1907), 22 Utah 51, 92 P. 789, the Court held that: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
frWhere time is of the essence of a contract of sale of real 
estate, but neither party exercised his right to declare an end 
to the contract, the vendor cannot, when the stipulations of the 
contract are mutual, dependent, and concurrent, legally placed 
the other party in default until he himself had tendered performance 
by tendered performance by tender of a deed, and accounting for the 
purchase money. " 
2. Point II of appellants1 brief makes two approaches to the matter 
of the tender by defendants of all delinquencies. The first is simply a matter of 
the application of the law to uncontested facts. Pr ior to the notice of default, 
Reed R. Maxfield on behalf of Suburbia Land Company, made a tender ,fof any 
and all amounts that are due J. R. Bagnall under the te rms of that certain real 
estate contract dated September 1, 1962.!f (Exhibit P-15) This tender was r e -
jected (Exhibits P-16, P-18), and the full accelerated balance demanded (Exhibit 
P-18). Again, on August 28, 1970, within the 30 days provided for in the notice 
of default, tender was again made of f,all amounts actually due" under the contract, 
(Exhibit P-32). None of the tenders, including the one of August 28, were accepted. 
(See pre t r ia l stipulation number 15) The appellants have argued at some length 
on pages 23 to 31 of their appeal brief, that the tenders were good as a matter of 
law, and they feel that the Court should respond to that arguement and give them 
the reasons for any decision made thereon. Even if no transcript at all had been 
designated, this argument would still have to be decided by the Court. 
Beginning on page 31 and continuing through page 35 of their appeal 
brief, appellants second approach points out the reasons why the testimony and 
weight of the evidence compel a finding that the tenders were good as a matter of 
fact as well as a matter of law. Some of the more pertinent facts to be considered 
by the Court are as follows: 
(a) July 5, 1969, tender (Exhibit P-15) rejected by the Bagnalls. 
(b) Maxfield had over $15, 000. 00 cash on hand to meet the tenders 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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as of July 5, 1969 (T-330, 331), and the Clearfield State Bank had committed to 
loan an additional $15, 000. 00 (Transcript book 1, p 232). 
(c) Buyer's net worth of $100, 000. 00 (Tr. bk. 3, P. 49) 
(d) Lester Ralph Romero had assets to back up the tender, was the 
owner of a going business concern in Salt Lake City, and had on deposit, as of 
October 23, 1969, a thrift certificate at Interlake Thrift for $10, 000. 00. (Tr. 365, 
Exhibit D-46). 
(e) August 28, 1970, buyers again tendered payment (Exhibit P-31). 
Again vendors did not accept. 
(f) Romero had on deposit with Interlake Thrift, as of October 26, 
1971, a thrift certificate for an additional $9, 000. 00. (exhibit D-47). 
(g) September 27, 1972, defendants made a proffer of proof consisting 
of $80, 000. 00 worth of certificates in the name of Romero antidating the tenders 
of July 5, 1969, and of August 28, 1970. (See Judge Erickson fs Order of October 
11, 1972). 
Defendants position on the weight of the evidence is amply supported 
by the testimony and exhibits before the Court. Hundreds of citations are given to 
the record, transcript and exhibits which will sustain defendants position. 
3. Point III of the t r ia l brief is again mostly a matter of the applica-
tion of the law to uncontested facts. Defendants contend that the plaintiffs waived 
tender by refusing to give defendants an accounting, by rejecting their written 
tenders, and by demanding the entire contract balance rather than just the delin-
quencies. Again, the record and the exhibits would seem to be sufficient to 
decide this matter without the necessity of recourse to any oral testimony. As 
is pointed out in detail on pages 35 through 40 of the appeal brief, written tenders 
were made by the vendees, and written rejections received from the vendors' 
lawyers, and written demand made by the vendors for the entire accelerated Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
balance due under the contract. They, of course, had no right to accelerate 
since there was no acceleration clause in the agreements. 
Recourse to the transcript of oral testimony, however, strengthens 
the conclusion that Bagnalls had waived tender, and that, consequently, Suburbia 
had no obligation to make a tender in any event. Maxfield, J. R. Bagnall, and 
Florence Bagnall all testified that within a few days of July 5, 1969, the Bagnalls, 
upon advice of counsel, determined that they would not take anything less than 
the improperly accelerated contract balance. (Tr. 108, 109, 166, and 299) 
Maxfield and J. R. Bagnall both testified that Mrs. Bagnall told Maxfield that 
they did not want the money, they wanted the land back. Defendants believe that 
the Court should have considered the legal and factual elements of their point III 
and ruled specifically thereon. 
4. Point IV is a straightforeward legal arugment going only to the 
question of the validity of the notice of default which admittedly asked for more 
than twice the alleged default. The Supreme Court in another case, has already 
ruled on that specific issue and found that such a notice, demanding more than 
was due, was defective and insufficient to effect a default under the contract. 
(See the case of Wayne E. Carroll vs. Phil M. Birdsoll (1970), 24 U. 2d. 411, 
472 P. 2d. 389.) In that case the notice demanded the alleged default, demanded 
$475. 00 attorney fees, and demanded an increased monthly payment in the future 
over and above the contracted payment. The Court stated that the notice obviously 
required the vendees to do more than could be required of them under the contract 
and made the following observation and ruling: 
"It is equally obvious that such a notice could not possibly 
convert buyers into tenants at will, since it required the buyers 
to do more than that for which the contract called, including 
unascertained costs and pre-determined attorney's fees before 
suit. " 
The Bagnall notice likewise reauired the buvprs to do RnTYiP+Viinc rvt-VtoT* 
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than in accordance with the te rms of the contract, namely to pay the accelerated 
balance. And, similarly to Carrol vs. Birdsall, Bagnall demanded unspecified 
interest. It is equally obvious that Bagnalls? notice could not possibly put the 
defendants into defualt, or as stated by the Carrol vs. Birdsall court, Mconvert 
buyers into tenants at will. " On this point of law alone, the judgment against 
defendants should be reversed and the plaintiffs1 complaint dismissed. 
5. Like many of the other arguments of defendants which were 
overlooked by the Court, point five as contained in the appeal brief is , again, a 
matter of law to be applied to basically undisputed facts. As is acknowledged by 
all parties, a payment of $400. 00 was made by the defendants to the escrow on 
December 1, 1971, which payment was regularly posted to interest, the escrow 
fees deducted, and the balance forewarded to Bagnalls. (Exhibit D-18). Plaintiffs 
refused the monies and returned them to the bank where they were deposited to a 
checking account opened by Bagnall (Exhibit P-27). The legal affect of that 
payment, the relationship of the bank as agent of either or both parties, its 
responsibilities and their effect upon the parties, e tc . , are all discussed at 
length in defendants' appeal brief on pages 47 through 53. These arguments do 
not depend, for the most part, upon any oral testimony, and are therefore 
subject to determination by the Court without resort to the transcript of oral 
testimony. To the extent that such testimony and exhibits are examined, however, 
the Court is led inexorably to the conclusion that the bank was the agent of Bagnall 
only, and that its acceptance of the payment for Bagnall was binding upon Bagnall 
and therefore reinstated the contract. 
6. Point six explores the legal effect of the offer to pay the 
entire contract balance into the registry of the Court, and the effect of the in-
dependant escrow set up by the defendants to back up the offer. Again, this is 
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a matter of law, and does not involve any disputed facts. It should, therefore, 
be decided by the Court regardless of the alleged state of the record. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESPOND TO THE SEVENTH 
POINT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANTS WHICH POINT WAS A QUESTION OF 
PROCEDURE AND HAD VERY LITTLE IF ANYTHING TO DO WITH ANYTHING 
CONTAINED IN THE TRIAL TESTIMONY. 
Point seven, set forth on pages 59 and 60 of the appeal brief discusses 
a point of procedural e r ro r by the t r ia l judge. As pointed out in the brief, the 
pre- t r ia l order and some of the determinations contained therein stand in direct 
contradiction to the findings of fact ultimately entered by the Court. Defendants 
make the point that the pre- t r ia l order should have been amended rather than 
ignored. This is a matter of law and could be ruled upon by the Supreme Court 
on the basis of the order and the findings, without access to any other part of the 
record. 
POINT V 
APPELLANTS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO A WRITTEN 
DECISION RESOLVING EACH OF THE POINTS RAISED IN THEIR APPEAL BRIEF 
STATING THE REASONS FOR THAT DECISION. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court fails to consider the points raised 
by the defendants in the original or reply brief, except for the supposed lack of 
citation to the record, and the problems surrounding the 140.15 acres of Jean 
Nyberg which was deeded to Utah Valley Land and ultimately to United Paint and 
Colors, and then bases its entire decision upon its misapprehension of these two 
facts. The Supreme Court simply ignores defendants contentions that (a) the 
plaintiffs1 prior defaults prevent them from defaulting the defendants; (b) that 
parol evidence should noi: be allowed to alter the effect of the warranties in the 
warranty deed nor to alter the provision in the modification agreement to the effect 
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defendants1 tenders of the delinquencies are valid under the statute without proof 
of ability to pay where, as here, the vendors rejected the tender and advised 
the vendee that they would not accept anything less than the total contract balance; 
(d) that vendors waived tender by their action in refusing anything less than the 
total contract balance and by advising defendants that they did not want the money 
in any event, that what they really wanted was the land back; (e) that plaintiffs1 
notice of default was fatally ambiguious and that the defendants could not determine 
therefrom what was required of them to avoid default, or; (f) that the notice was 
defective because it demanded performance other than that required by the contract; 
(g) that by accepting money on the contract after notice of default the contract was 
reinstated; (h) that the escrow was the agent for sel lers only; (i) that the defendants 
proffer of $80, 000. 00 worth of savings certificates antedating the tenders compelled 
a finding for the defendants; (j) that the defendants offer to pay the entire contract 
balance into the registry of the Court reinstated the contract; (k) that the t r ia l 
Court should have amended the pre- t r ia l order rather than to simply ignore it. 
Rule 76 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads in part as follows: 
11
. . . every decision of the court, together with the reasons therefore concisely 
stated, shall be given in wri t ing. . . " Article VIII, Section 25, of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah reads in part as follows: ! ^ h e n a judgment or decree is 
reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court, the reasons therefore 
shall be stated concisely in wr i t ing . . . ! ! 
This case is a matter of great importance to all of the parties 
involved, and involves a very valuable piece of real estate. Defendants believe 
that a careful consideration of the points raised in their briefs will compel an 
order reversing the t r ia l courts findings and dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint. 
Defendants briefs, particularly when read together are replete with citation to 
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the transcript, exhibits, and the record, and clearly set forth the legal and factual 
matters to be determined by the Court. 
Defendants are constitutionally entitled to a decision of the Court 
responding to each of the issues raised by the defendants. The writer also sincerely 
believes that the legal issues raised by the defendants are ripe for determination 
by this Court as precedent for later similar disputes. A more detailed decision 
which considers the various legal issues raised by the defendants is clearly 
appropriate and justifies rehearing of this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
To justify rehearing or modification of a decision of the Supreme 
Court a strong case must be made that the Court has seriously erred, and that the 
e r ror materially affects the result. (Cummings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 
P. 619.) Matters justifying rehearing or modification of a decision include situations 
where the Court has (a) misconstrued or overlooked some material fact, (b) has 
overlooked some statute or decision, (c) has based the decision on some wrong 
principle of law, (d) has misapplied or overlooked something which materially 
affects the results , (e) has failed to correctly state the law, etc. (Beaver County vs 
Home Indemnity Co. , 88 Utah 1, 52 P. 2d. 435. Cummings vs. Nielson supra). The 
Court seriously erred in numerous areas and in numerous manners which matterially 
affected the result of this case, as follows: 
1. The Court concluded, apparently without reading the record or 
defendants briefs, that the defendants had designated only those portions of the 
record favorable to themselves and that much that was designated was controverted 
by the undesignated portions. As discussed in detail above, the conclusion is not 
justified. 
2. The Court erred in concluding that it should affirm the decision of 
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the t r ia l court unless the entire record is before it. At this point the writer 
wishes merely to restate the correct proposition that even with only a partial 
transcript the Court must reverse if there is evidence before it which will compell 
reversal . Such compelling evidence has been pointed out by counsel and discussed 
at great length in the appeal and reply briefs. 
3. The Court erred in its finding that the defendants1 briefs were 
loaded with unreferenced and self-serving statements of facts and contentions. 
With 239 citations to the transcript, exhibits, and record, it can hardly be said 
that defendants' briefs were unreferenced. 
4. The Court erred in failing to respond to defendants' contention 
that the substantial and material prior defaults of the plaintiffs prevented them 
from defaulting the defendants. 
5. The Court erred in failing to find that parol evidence should not 
be allowed to alter the meaning aiid effect of the unambiguous warranty deed, real 
estate agreement, and modification agreement. 
6. The Court erred in failing to rule upon defendants' contention 
that the written tenders of all amounts due under the contract, coming before 
notice of default, are valid as a matter of law, especially where, as here, plaintiffs 
rejected the tenders, and told defendants that they would not accept anything less 
than the total contract balance, and that they did not want the money, they wanted 
the land back. 
7. The Court erred by failing to rule upon defendants' contention 
that the notice of default was fatally ambiguous and that it was otherwise defective 
because it demanded more than was due under the contract. 
8. The Court erred by failing to respond to the defendants' contention 
that the escrow was the agent of the plaintiffs only. 
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9. The Court erred by failing to determine the defendants' claim 
that the payment of $400. 00 to the escrow after the notice of default, and the 
acceptance thereof by the escrow constituted a waiver of the notice and reinstated 
the contract. 
10. The Court erred in failing to consider the effect of defendants1 
proffer of $80, 000. 00 worth of savings certificates, or to consider the defendants' 
offer to pay the entire amount due on the contract, together with fees and costs, 
into the registry of the Court. 
11. That the pre- t r ia l order should have been followed or amended, 
rather than merely ignored is another contention of the defendants. The Court 's 
failure to address itself to that proposition also constitutes e r ror . 
The writer apologizes to the Court for the length and complexity of 
this brief, as well as the earl ier ones. In an attempt to reduce the size hereof, 
many references to the record which would otherwise be appropriate have been 
omitted. All such required references are included in the appeal and reply 
briefs on file however. Defendants, through their counsel, also request the 
court to grant them the opportunity for oral argument on this motion for rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT L. LORD 
118 Metro Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellants 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing, postage 
prepaid, this 26th day of December, 1975, to Jackson Howard, for Howard Lewis 
& Peterson, attorneys for the plaintiff-respondents, 120 East 300 North, Provo, 
Utah, 84601. 
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